Libre arbitre
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Nicolas Gisin
“I have more evidence of my free will than I do for the Schrödinger equation.”
— Nicolas Gisin
“*I know that I enjoy free will much more than I know anything about physics. Hence, physics will never be able to convince me that free will is an illusion. Quite the contrary, any physical hypothesis incompatible with free will is falsified by the most profound experience I have about free will.
So, would I have rejected Newtonian classical mechanics had I lived before quantum physics? Probably not. Indeed, classical physics leaves open the possibility that free will can somehow interface with the deterministic Newtonian equations: free will could set-up some potential that could slightly influence particles’s motion. This would be something like Descartes pineal gland. In standard quantum physics such an interface between free will and physics could be even simpler: free will could influence the probabilities of quantum events. This is, admittedly, a vague and not very original idea; but important is that there is no obvious definite contradiction between free will and standard quantum physics.*”
— Nicolas Gisin
Cf. Nicolas Gisin.
SEP
3.2 Arguments for the Reality of Free Will
If one is a compatibilist, then a case for the reality of free will requires evidence for our being effective agents who for the most part are aware of what we do and why we are doing it. If one is an incompatibilist, then the case requires in addition evidence for causal indeterminism, occurring in the right locations in the process leading from deliberation to action. Many think that we already have third-personal ‘neutral’ scientific evidence for much of human behavior’s satisfying modest compatibilist requirements, such as Fischer and Ravizza’s reasons-responsiveness account. However, given the immaturity of social science and the controversy over whether psychological states ‘reduce’ in some sense to underlying physical states (and what this might entail for the reality of mental causation), this claim is doubtful. A more promising case for our satisfying (at least) compatibilist requirements on freedom is that effective agency is presupposed by all scientific inquiry and so cannot rationally be doubted (which fact is overlooked by some of the more extreme ‘willusionists’ such as Wegner).
However, effective intervention in the world (in scientific practice and elsewhere) does not (obviously) require that our behavior be causally undetermined, so the ‘freedom is rationally presupposed’ argument cannot be launched for such an understanding of freedom. Instead, incompatibilists usually give one of the following two bases for rational belief in freedom (both of which can be given by compatibilists, too).
First, philosophers have long claimed that we have introspective evidence of freedom in our experience of action, or perhaps of consciously attended or deliberated action. Augustine and Scotus, discussed earlier, are two examples among many. In recent years, philosophers have been more carefully scrutinizing the experience of agency and a debate has emerged concerning its contents, and in particular whether it supports an indeterministic theory of human free action. For discussion, see Deery et al. (2013), Guillon (2014), Horgan (2015), and Bayne (2017).
Second, philosophers (e.g., Reid 1788 [1969], Swinburne 2013) sometimes claim that our belief in the reality of free will is epistemically basic, or reasonable without requiring independent evidential support. Most philosophers hold that some beliefs have that status, on pain of our having no justified beliefs whatever. It is controversial, however, just which beliefs do because it is controversial which criteria a belief must satisfy to qualify for that privileged status. It is perhaps necessary that a basic belief be ‘instinctive’ (unreflectively held) for all or most human beings; that it be embedded in regular experience; and that it be central to our understanding of an important aspect of the world. Our belief in free will seems to meet these criteria, but whether they are sufficient is debated. (O’Connor 2019 proposes that free will belief is epistemically basic but defeasible.) Other philosophers defend a variation on this stance, maintaining instead that belief in the reality of moral responsibility is epistemically basic, and that since moral responsibility entails free will, or so it is claimed, we may infer the reality of free will (see, e.g., van Inwagen 1983, 206–13).
Source : https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/freewill/#ArguForRealFreeWill
CTMU
Q: Can Chris Langan prove that free will exists?
A: Yes, I can. It’s a matter of properly characterizing the freedom of reality itself, and then showing that this freedom is internally replicated for systems meeting the appropriate criteria within reality (in the CTMU, these special subsystems of reality are called telors).
Such a proof is possible only within the CTMU. Others have advanced their own arguments for free will, or pointed to what they assume is “evidence” for free will. However, the arguments and evidence in question are selectively interpreted in light of supporting assumptions which are themselves both ill-defined and devoid of any proof whatsoever. As the CTMU requires no assumptions, it avoids this shortcoming.
In principle, human beings are telors and therefore possess free will. However, many are degenerate, having surrendered or sold their freedom in return for various amenities and necessities of survival. This is largely why the world often seems to be hurtling toward self-destruction like a runaway freight train.
— Chris Langan, Quora
Q: Does Chris Langan believe in free will?
A: Yes. My belief in free will stems from my knowledge concerning it. This knowledge relates to a theory of mathematical metaphysics called the CTMU (Cognitive Theoretic Model of the Universe). The CTMU is the only intrinsically viable, self-contained ontology in existence. In fact, it is the only one possible.
[Note: Another answer to this question, emanating from a troll account of which Quora Moderation has been repeatedly informed but to no avail, asserts that free will is pointless if there are penalties attached to its improper use. However, the point of free will is not to use it improperly, but to use it properly in service of teleology, thus avoiding the metaphysical penalties attached to its chronic abuse. One is allowed to make the occasional honest mistake, but not to latch onto the same tired mistake over and over again like a mad dog, growling and gnawing and foaming from the mouth. (Free will is a requisite of meaning in our lives, but can be a very dangerous thing. It’s a pass-fail test of sorts, but with very appreciable risks and rewards attached to one’s score. Obviously, it is best that everyone understand this, and not end up having to whine about it as though one had no choice between good and evil.)]
— Chris Langan, Quora
Michael Huemer
11.4.2. For Free Will: The Appeal to Introspection
We just argued that determinism conflicts with free will. Some people would conclude that we in fact have no free will (as in §11.2). Not the libertarians, though. The libertarians instead infer that determinism must be false, since we obviously do have free will.
Why believe in free will? One reason is introspection: It just seems, introspectively, that we can often observe ourselves freely choosing among multiple options. And nearly everyone, even the determinists, agrees that our choices generally feel free.
In response, hard determinists often say this is an “illusion”, adding that we are determined to experience this illusion. This reply, however, is very lame by itself – that is, if not supplemented with actual evidence that shows free will to be illusory. In general, if we seem to observe something, it is very lame to simply say, “Oh, that’s an illusion” and move on. Rational people assume that what we seem to observe is real, unless there is evidence to the contrary; they don’t assume that whatever we seem to observe is illusory until proven real (see §7.6).
Example: Silly Sam claims that there are no blue foods in the world. Smart Sally shows Sam a blueberry, then eats it in front of him, thus refuting Sam’s claim. Sam declares: “Oh, that’s just an illusion.” He gives no further argument, evidence, or explanation. When asked why he thinks it was an illusion, Sam replies, “Because there are no blue foods.” In this case, Sam’s defense is dialectically pathetic. That’s just like the determinist who declares “free will is an illusion”, with no further justification.
Here is a better reply on behalf of the (hard) determinist: Free will requires that you have unrealized possibilities – things that you could have done but did not actually do. But the only things a person can ever observe, even in principle – whether it be introspective observation or observation by the five senses – are things that actually happen or actually exist. For instance, if there is a cat on the table, you can observe that, but if there isn’t actually a cat but there merely could have been one, you can’t observe that. There’s nothing that a merely possible cat looks like. Similarly, you can’t observe merely possible actions, so you can’t observe that you have alternative possibilities, so you can’t observe that you have free will.
Nevertheless, it strongly seems as if we have free will. Perhaps this sense of our freedom isn’t exactly an observation (since, as claimed above, one can’t observe unrealized possibilities); perhaps we should call it an “intuition”, or something like that. Regardless of whether it counts as “observation” or not, one should generally assume that things are as they seem to be, until proven otherwise – and there is no dispute that we seem to have free will.
Source : Huemer, M. (2022). Knowledge, Reality, and Value.
Irréfutabilité
“Pour moi, la situation est très claire : non seulement le libre arbitre existe, mais il vient logiquement avant la science, la philosophie et notre capacité à raisonner. Sans libre arbitre, pas de raisonnement. En conséquence, il est tout simplement impossible pour la science et la philosophie de nier le libre arbitre.”
— Nicolas Gisin
Théorème du libre arbitre
Remarquons encore que le “libre-arbitre” peut se décliner en deux versions : le non-déterminisme et le hasard. On pourrait imaginer que les décisions des expérimentateurs, aussi bien que celles des particules, soient entièrement aléatoires. Mais il faut remarquer que l’existence (vérifiée) des particules jumelles (intriquées) contredit cet argument : si les décisions des particules étaient aléatoires, elles ne pourraient être intriquées. En d’autre termes la liberté peut se jumeler, l’aléatoirité non. Ce sont deux notions distinctes.
Source : http://sboisse.free.fr/science/physique/theoreme-du-libre-arbitre.php
Toute tentative de preuve du dtérminisme serait contradictoire
S’il y a déterminisme, il n’y a même pas de rationalité, de preuves ou démonstrations, car toute justification présuppose des normes épistémiques : pour prouver quelque thèse que ce soit, par exemple le déterminisme, il faut au préalable adhérer à des normes épistémiques : “croire seulement sur la base de preuves suffisantes”, “se baser sur les lois de la logique”, etc.
Or, ces normes épistémiques sont déontologiques : elles impliquent des obligations épistémiques et requièrent le libre arbitre : décider d’accepter une preuve empirique plutôt qu’une autre, décider de suivre les lois de la logique plutôt que de suivre une intuition potentiellement biaisée, etc. — ce qui présuppose la capacité de réfléchir autrement, et contrevient donc au déterminisme.
Grok 4 :
https://grok.com/chat/410cb2e1-0f97-4dd8-8f90-44a4c850cd5a
L’argument philosophique que vous décrivez est connu sous le nom d’argument transcendantal épistémique contre le déterminisme, plus précisément la variante indirecte (Indirect Epistemic Transcendental Argument for Freedom), développée notamment par le philosophe Robert Lockie dans son ouvrage Free Will and Epistemology: A Defence of the Transcendental Argument for Freedom (2018). Cet argument vise à montrer que le déterminisme est auto-réfutant (self-defeating), car toute tentative de le prouver ou de le justifier présuppose des conditions épistémiques qui impliquent la liberté de choix, contredisant ainsi le déterminisme lui-même.
Explication de l’argument
L’argument repose sur une analyse transcendantale, c’est-à-dire qu’il examine les conditions de possibilité de la connaissance et de la justification épistémique. Voici sa structure principale, adaptée à votre description :
Le déterminisme nie la liberté : Si le déterminisme est vrai, alors aucun agent ne peut agir ou raisonner autrement que ce qui est déterminé par des causes antérieures. Il n’y a pas de véritable choix, y compris dans le raisonnement ou la formation de croyances.
Toute démonstration ou justification présuppose des normes épistémiques : Pour prouver une thèse comme le déterminisme (ou toute autre), il faut adhérer à des normes épistémiques (par exemple, “croire seulement sur la base de preuves suffisantes”, “éviter les croyances fausses”, ou utiliser la logique déductive). Ces normes sont déontologiques : elles impliquent des obligations épistémiques (“on doit croire de manière justifiée”).
Ces normes épistémiques requièrent un choix libre : Appliquer ou choisir des normes épistémiques (par exemple, décider d’accepter une preuve empirique plutôt qu’une autre, ou de suivre une règle logique plutôt qu’une intuition biaisée) présuppose la capacité de “raisonner autrement” (ability to do otherwise in reasoning). Sans cette liberté, il n’y a pas de justification réelle, car les croyances seraient uniquement le produit de causes déterminées, non d’une évaluation normative. Comme le souligne Lockie, la justification épistémique interne et déontologique exige que l’agent puisse être tenu responsable de ses jugements, ce qui implique une forme de liberté.
Contradiction performative : Si le déterminisme est vrai, alors la croyance en le déterminisme elle-même ne peut pas être justifiée selon ces normes, car il n’y aurait pas de choix libre dans le processus de démonstration. Prétendre prouver le déterminisme revient donc à présupposer la liberté (pour choisir et appliquer les normes épistémiques) tout en la niant. Cela rend l’argument auto-contradictoire : le déterminisme, s’il est vrai, rend impossible la justification de sa propre vérité.
Comment arriver à cette conclusion (raisonnement structuré)
- Étape 1 : Supposez que le déterminisme soit vrai (hypothèse pour la reductio ad absurdum).
- Étape 2 : Dans ce cas, aucune croyance n’est formée par choix libre, mais seulement par déterminations causales.
- Étape 3 : Or, pour démontrer une thèse, il faut justifier ses croyances via des normes épistémiques, qui exigent la possibilité de choisir (par exemple, sélectionner des critères de preuve, rejeter des biais, ou opter pour une méthode épistémologique comme le foundationalisme ou le cohèrentisme).
- Étape 4 : Sans cette possibilité de choix, il n’y a pas de justification épistémique authentique (seulement des croyances déterminées, non normatives).
- Étape 5 : Par conséquent, la croyance en le déterminisme ne peut pas être justifiée, ce qui contredit l’hypothèse initiale (car une preuve requiert une justification).
- Conclusion : Le déterminisme doit être faux, car sa vérité rendrait impossible sa propre démonstration. Cela implique une forme minimale de liberté (au moins dans le raisonnement épistémique).
Cet argument s’inscrit dans une tradition plus large, incluant des influences de Kant (qui distinguait raison théorique et pratique, avec la liberté comme postulat pratique) et des philosophes contemporains comme Habermas ou Apel, qui parlent de “contradiction performative” dans le discours argumentatif (où argumenter présuppose la liberté des participants). Il est critiqué pour son recours à une conception déontologique stricte de l’épistémologie, mais reste un pilier des débats sur le libre arbitre et le déterminisme. Si vous cherchez des variantes, des critiques existent, comme celle de Luca Zanetti, qui conteste la nécessité des obligations épistémiques pour le déterministe.